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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 20050013-CA 
ROBERT CRAIG THOMAS, : 
Defendant/Appellant : 
ARGUMENT 
This Reply Brief addresses the assertion that the sentencing issues were not 
preserved for appeal (Point I), and the argument that imposing four consecutive sentences 
was not an abuse of discretion (Point II). 
Point I: The Issue of Sentencing Was Preserved for Appeal, 
The Brief of Appellee, at 18-20, asserts that Robert Craig Thomas, 
Defendant/Appellant, did not preserve for appeal his challenge to consecutive sentences. 
This reply establishes that Mr. Thomas submitted the issue to the sentencing court, 
which then ruled on the merits (Section A), and there was not invited error (Section B). 
A. Mr. Thomas argued the facts and law relevant to what sentence the court 
should impose, and the court twice ruled on the merits in imposing 
consecutive sentences. 
The state constructs a straw-man argument by noting that Mr. Thomas offered no 
objection upon imposition of consecutive sentences, and that Mr. Thomas' subsequent 
Motion for Relief from Judgment insufficiently detailed the legal basis for reversing the 
imposition of consecutive sentences. In so doing, the state ignores the discussion 
between defense counsel, the trial court and Mr. Thomas himself, over what sentence the 
court should impose prior to the court's imposition of consecutive sentences. Each 
criterion identified by the legislature in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003) as to 
whether prison sentences should run concurrently or consecutively was raised at the 
hearing. 
Sound public policy requires that parties raise issues so as to permit the trial court 
to timely decide them on their merits. See State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). A party that fails to raise a substantive 
issue before the trial court is typically prevented from asserting that issue on appeal. 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm % 945 P.2d 125, 129-30 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
Preservation occurs where the issue is timely brought to the court's attention with 
sufficient evidence or legal authority to facilitate the court's adjudication of said issue. 
The three touchstones for preservation are summarized as follows: 
First, the issue must be raised in a timely fashion. This court has explained: 
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely 
bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the 
court an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. 'Issues not raised 
in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding 
[the appellate court] from considering their merits on appeal.5 
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(citations omitted). Second, the issue must be specifically raised, see State 
v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1989), such that the issue is 
sufficiently raised to a "level of consciousness" before the trial court, 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Third, the 
party must introduce to the trial court "supporting evidence or relevant 
legal authority" to support its argument. Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water 
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Ca, 912 P.2d 457, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted); see also 
West One Bank, 887 P.2d at 882 n.l ("'The mere mention of an issue in the 
pleadings . . . is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to 
preserve the issue for appeal.'" (quotingLeBaron & Assocs.y Inc. v. Rebel 
Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1991))). 
Hart, at 945 P.2d 129-30. 
These three factors are present in the case on review. First, the issue of sentencing 
was timely raised, both at the sentencing hearing, prior to the court's imposition of four 
consecutive sentences, and by the post-sentence motion, pursuant to which the court 
affirmed its imposition of consecutive sentences. The court ruled on the merits not once, 
but twice. Contrast Williams v. Williams, 2004 UT App 245 (Memorandum Decision, 
attached hereto as Addendum A)(issue was not preserved because no ruling was sought or 
rendered, thus depriving the appellate court of a record to review). 
Second, the issue of sentencing was certainly brought to the court's consciousness. 
It was argued, after all, at Mr. Thomas' sentencing hearing. Both defense counsel and 
Mr. Thomas argued for inpatient treatment in lieu of prison. The court and Mr. Thomas 
discussed prison versus treatment, and the possible value of further diagnostic evaluation. 
The court expressly informed Mr. Thomas that a sentence considerably longer than two 
months of prison was at stake should he undergo diagnostic evaluation and perform 
poorly. See Transcript, Sentencing (Dec. 3, 2004), at 7:20 - 8:7 (the sentencing transcript 
is attached to the Brief of Appellee as an addendum, and is referred to herein as 
"Sentencing T."). The issues related to sentencing, prison, consecutive versus concurrent 
terms, and the options related thereto were on the table for all to see. 
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Third, each criterion identified by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) as relevant to the 
imposition of consecutive sentences was addressed at the sentencing hearing. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(2) provides, "In determining whether state offenses are to run 
concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of 
the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant." 
The gravity of the offenses was detailed by one victim and the husband of another. 
Sentencing T. at 4:23 - 7:11. The presentence report and the addendum thereto detail the 
nature of the offenses, as well as the number of victims. Mr. Thomas' history, in addition 
to the detailed summary in the presentence report, was succinctly summarized by Mr. 
Thomas himself: 
I'm a drug addict. I'm sorry for what I did to [the victims of his crimes]. 
You think I like doing what I do? No, I don't like doing it. I want to go to 
Odyssey House where I can get some help. 
Sentencing T., at 8:25 - 9:3. His historic ability to succeed outside prison, contrasted 
against the opinion offered in the presentence report, was addressed by defense counsel. 
Id at 3:15-20. Mr. Thomas' character, in particular his willingness to accept 
responsibility for his choices and actions, were not only touched upon in the previous 
quote, but by defense counsel as well. E.g., id. at 3:8-14. Finally, Mr. Thomas' 
rehabilitative needs, along with how to best address those needs, were discussed by 
defense counsel and Mr. Thomas. Id. at 3:8 - 4:8, 7:15 - 9:16. 
Unclear is what, in addition to the foregoing, Mr. Thomas could have done to 
better facilitate the trial court's adjudication on the merits of what sentence to impose. 
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B. The doctrine of invited error does not apply to Mr. Thomas' statements. 
The Brief of Appellee, at 14-15, argues that Mr. Thomas invited consecutive 
sentences by comments made at the sentencing hearing, and thus he cannot claim error 
based upon the imposition of four consecutive terms of confinement. 
When Mr. Thomas was offered a ninety-day diagnostic evaluation instead of 
immediate inpatient treatment, he effectively replied that the court should just sentence 
him to prison because this was the result of every prior evaluation he had undertaken. 
See, e.g., Sentencing T. at 8:9 - 9:16. A fair reading of Mr. Thomas' comments suggests 
they were made by a man long on fatalism and short on hope. How many times in 
ordinary conversation does one hear a lament such as, "If that's the case, just put me out 
of my misery now instead of later"? Yet no one takes seriously such requests. No one in 
this case should have taken seriously Mr. Thomas' comments. 
Yet, even it taken literally, Mr. Thomas' comments do not invite imposition of four 
consecutive sentences. The most unforgiving interpretation is that Mr. Thomas preferred 
an immediate prison commitment to undergoing yet another diagnostic evaluation that, in 
his mind, would inevitably have led to hard time anyway. Most importantly, not only did 
Mr. Thomas voice a preference for inpatient treatment throughout the hearing, he said 
nothing that invited four consecutive sentences, as opposed to ones run concurrently. 
Point II: The Court Abused Its Discretion in Sentencing Mr. Thomas to 
Four Consecutive Sentences. 
The sentencing transcript reveals that, following defense counsel's discussion of 
the factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (setting forth factors relevant to 
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imposing consecutive sentences), the sentencing court initially preferred to impose a 
diagnostic evaluation upon Mr. Thomas. It reveals Mr. Thomas5 contrary and somewhat 
fatalistic response thereto. The court certainly remained free to accord whatever weight it 
thought appropriate to Mr. Thomas' response. Where as here, however, Mr. Thomas was 
entitled to offer such statements, Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a), and he did so respectfully, the 
trial court was not free to penalize him therefor. See State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79, fflf 21, 
23, 99 P.3d 858 (right to be free from harsher sentence based upon vindictiveness). As 
detailed below in reply to the Brief of Appellee, at 20-25, such penalization constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. 
A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider "all legally relevant 
factors." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^  8, 40 P.3d 626, quoting State v. McCovey, 803 
P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990), quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 
1989). The significance of such consideration when imposing consecutive sentences 
stems from concerns over the "oppressive and inequitable]" effects of long sentences. 
State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 121 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 
1991); see State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
401(6)(a)(limiting, with exceptions, the aggregate maximum of consecutive sentences to 
thirty years). 
Under ordinary circumstances, a trial court is presumed to have at least considered 
the legally relevant factors when it imposes a sentence even if it does not state its findings 
on the record. E.g., Helms, 2002 UT 12, U 11. In Helms, the trial court carefully 
reviewed the detailed presentence report prior to the sentencing hearing, and the report 
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was discussed at some length prior to imposition of sentence. Moreover, the court 
received and reviewed a letter from the defendant's sister. Id. at ^ 5-6. On appeal, the 
court reasoned that the sentencing court must have considered the statutory factors 
relevant to imposing consecutive sentences, and held that the defendant had not met his 
burden of producing evidence to the contrary. It affirmed the trial court's imposition of 
consecutive sentences. Id. at ^  11-16. 
In State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665 (Utah 1997), another case cited in the Brief of 
Appellee, at 21, the sentencing court had presided over the defendant's competency 
hearing and his trial. The sentencing court noted, "I have received more information 
about Mr. Woodland than I have about any other criminal defendant since I have been 
judge." Based upon this record, the appeals court affirmed the sentence imposed below. 
M a t 671. 
This legal authority, however, is inapposite to the facts of the case on appeal. The 
"wide latitude and discretion in sentencing" typically accorded he sentencing court, 
Helms, 2002 UT 12, If 8, quoting Woodland, 945 P.2d at 671, gives way where "an 
ambiguity of facts" undermines the presumption that the sentencing court did, indeed, 
consider all the statutory factors relevant to imposing consecutive sentences. Helms, 
2002 UT 12, % 11. So it was that in State v. Galli, supra, the reviewing court reversed the 
imposition of consecutive prison sentences because the record indicated that the 
sentencing courts "failed to give 'adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances.'" 
Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 15, citing Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. 
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In contrast to Helms and Woodland, for example, the court that sentenced Mr. 
Thomas had no involvement whatsoever in the proceedings that resulted in his guilty plea 
to two of the four offenses at issue herein. The only prior contact of any substance 
between the sentencing court and Mr. Thomas was its taking of his guilty plea to the other 
two charges. There was no competency hearing and no trial. In view of its limited 
involvement with Mr. Thomas' case, the sentencing court's rationale for imposing four 
consecutive sentences, when only moments before it was considering probation options, 
is important. 
The Utah Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") staff that prepared the presentence 
report and the addendum thereto had extensive contact with Mr. Thomas, his records and 
history, and the victims. AP&P recommended concurrent sentences - not consecutive. 
The sentencing court, however, did not once acknowledge AP&P's recommendation 
either before or after its sudden switch from considering treatment options to imposing 
consecutive sentences. This makes the sentencing court's rationale even more crucial. 
The briefs of both appellant and appellee herein debate the applicability of State v. 
Perez, 2002 UT App 211,52 P.2d 451. And for good reason: there as here, AP&P 
recommended concurrent sentences, the prosecuting attorney did not seek deviation from 
AP&P's recommendation, the sentencing court neither demonstrated a familiarity with 
the presentence report nor provided any reason to deviate from AP&P's recommendation, 
and instead focused upon one factor set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) 
(reorganized as subsection (2) in 2002) to the near exclusion of the others in imposing 
consecutive sentences. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ^ 48. 
8 
The Brief of Appellee, at 24, argues that Perez is inapplicable because the 
sentencing court was familiar with the presentence report, and thus the information 
therein, as evidenced by the court's suggestion that Mr. Thomas undergo a ninety-day 
evaluation. The presentence report, however, argues against granting Mr. Thomas' 
request for inpatient treatment, noting instead that Mr. Thomas was likely to request such 
treatment even though he had already completed three substance abuse programs. The 
sentencing court raised the issue of obtaining "a diagnostic" in response to defense 
counsel's request that Mr. Thomas be placed in inpatient treatment despite AP&P's 
recommendation against such a placement. Sentencing T., at 3:15-23. Insofar as the 
court was at first willing to entertain the possibility of treatment despite AP&P's 
recommendation of incarceration, and then concluded the hearing by imposing four 
consecutive sentences despite AP&P's recommendation of concurrent sentences, there is 
precious little evidence of the court's familiarity with the presentence report and the 
addendum thereto. The state's protestations notwithstanding, this case is strikingly 
similar to Galli, where the courts failed to consider mitigating factors, and to Perez, 
where the court failed to consider anything but the circumstances of the offense. 
In the case on review, the sentencing court was initially willing to order an 
evaluation that might lead to inpatient treatment - before, that is, Mr. Thomas quite 
plainly rubbed the court the wrong way. Where a court is disposed to imposing one 
sentence, only to change its mind and then impose a harsher sentence based upon 
irrelevant considerations, it abuses its discretion. See State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 
(Utah 1957). In this case, at one moment, the court urged defense counsel to confer with 
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Mr. Thomas about the proposed diagnostic examination. Sentencing T., at 9:11-22. 
Then, immediately following the client-attorney conference during which the court 
handled other matters, the court summarily imposed four consecutive sentences based 
upon Mr. Thomas' perceived attitude - and the attitude alone: 
(The Court gave attention to other maters on the call.) 
The Court: We have a theft by receiving, a third, and a forgery, a third. Is 
that correct, counsel? 
Ms. Roberts [defense counsel]: I believe so. 
The Court: Mr. Thomas, your attitude has had an impact on me. I'm 
inclined to do what you've asked and to do it, and that is sentence you to 
prison. 
The Defendant: Okay, your Honor. Thank you. 
The Court: It will be the order of the Court that Mr. Thomas is sentenced to 
prison on the third-degree felony to the indeterminate term of zero to five 
years. On the forgery, it's to run consecutive, and it's also a zero-to-five 
commitment, forthwith. 
Sentencing T , at 9:23 - 10:11. 
The one and only criterion it considered on the way from entertaining the 
possibility of inpatient treatment to imposing consecutive sentences was Mr. Thomas' 
attitude. There is no suggestion that the court, in making this dramatic switch, considered 
the legal criteria set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). Likewise, as was the case in 
Perez, 2002 Utah App 211, \ 48, the sentencing court did not address - explicitly or 
otherwise - the presentence report's recommendation of concurrent sentences. Nothing in 
the record, apart from the court's distain for what it perceived as Mr. Thomas' attitude, 
explains its deviation from AP&P's reasoned recommendation. 
10 
The foregoing constitutes "an ambiguity of facts" that rebut the presumption that 
the sentencing court considered all statutorily required criteria when it switched from 
considering inpatient treatment to imposing four consecutive sentences. See Helms, 2002 
UT 12, ^ [ 11. The record clearly shows that it was not statutory factors or AP&P's 
recommendations that led to imposition of consecutive sentences, but rather the 
sentencing court's annoyance with Mr. Thomas and his perceived attitude. 
Sentencing a defendant to consecutive sentences based upon the defendant's 
perceived attitude constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Conclusion 
Mr. Thomas preserved the sentencing issues for appeal and did not invite 
consecutive sentences. The sentencing court abused its discretion when it sentenced Mr. 
Thomas to four consecutive terms of confinement only when Mr. Thomas respectfully 
disagreed over the need for and value of further diagnostic evaluation. The commitment 
to consecutive terms should be vacated, and the case remanded for a new sentencing 
hearing. 
DATED this £±_ day of September, 2005. 
John Pace 
Catherine E. Roberts 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Mark Allen Williams, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Lenora Gail Williams, Respondent 
and Appellant. 
Case No. 20030011-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2004 UT App 245; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 290 
July 15, 2004, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION 
COUNSEL: Michael J. Boyle, Ogden, for Appellant 
F. Kevin Bond and Budge W. Call, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
OPINION: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Respondent (Wife) first argues that the trial court erred in failing to comply with rule 63 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We disagree. Rule 63 requires that a motion to 
disqualify a judge must "be accompanied by a certificate that the motion is filed in good 
faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient to show bias, prejudice 
or conflict of interest." Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Here, the court 
acknowledged the receipt of a certificate that the motion was filed in good faith. 
However, Wife did not provide the required supporting affidavit. Furthermore, a motion 
to disqualify must "be filed after commencement of the action, but not later than 20 days 
after . . . assignment [*2] of the action or hearing to the judge" or "the date on which the 
moving party learns or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of 
the grounds upon which the motion is based." Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(1)(B). For several 
months before trial, Wife knew that Judge Page was assigned to the case. Wife also had 
every document that now forms the basis fpr the allegation of bias. Yet, the motion was 
not filed until the day of trial. Therefore, because Wife's motion to disqualify was 
untimely and lacked the required affidavit, the motion was facially deficient. 
Wife next contends that the court erred when it limited the cross examination of 
Petitioner (Husband) on the issue of bonuses. "We will not interfere with a trial court's 
decision to limit [testimony] unless the trial court abused its discretion." Shepherd v. 
Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah Ct. App, 1994). Here, "the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in limiting [Husband's] testimony" because the nature of the bonuses was 
adequately addressed during trial. Id. Both Husband's father and the company's 
accountant testified that bonuses were strictly tied to net profit, and that bonuses [*3] to 
Husband had not been given since 2000 because the company had a loss in net profit. 
Furthermore, the court stated that 'Til find that he regularly gets a bonus, except for the 
last two years and I'll make a provision for that." 
Wife further alleges that the court erred in not finding Husband in contempt of a previous 
temporary order requiring Husband to maintain health insurance for their minor child. 
Wife's argument fails because this issue was not adequately preserved below. While there 
was testimony regarding health insurance at trial, Wife failed to request a ruling on this 
issue from the court. Therefore, there is no ruling for us to review. See Hart v. Salt Lake 
County Comm% 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Lastly, Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of 
alimony, contending that Husband's bonuses were not properly factored into Wife's 
alimony. We disagree. Contrary to Wife's assertion, the court properly included bonus 
payments into the alimony. In the court's final findings, the court ordered that "any 
bonuses received by the petitioner [Husband] in this matter are to be shared with the [*4] 
respondent [Wife] so long as he is paying alimony, and that bonus is to be shared with the 
respondent in a percentage of 15 percent of any bonus so paid." 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Russell W. Bench, Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
